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Ahead of the Cur ve: Pr omoting Land Tenur e
Secur ity in Sub-Sahar an Afr ica to Pr otect the
Envir onment
Andrew R. Falk*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2006, the Sub-Saharan African economy has grown as fast as
almost any economy in the world.1 At the same time, hundreds of millions
of people still live in extreme poverty.2 One important reason for this
disparity is that the economy is largely based on agriculture, which requires
access to land. Far too many people lack such access.3 Thus, the absence of
secure land tenure has contributed greatly to the institutionalization of

*

Andrew R. Falk is a Senior Fellow with the Sagamore Institute in Indianapolis, Indiana,
where he researches international environmental law and property issues. He also studies
domestic criminal justice reform. In writing this article, Andrew gratefully acknowledges
the invaluable research assistance of Benjamin Pickett and the instrumental drafting and
editing assistance of David Dickmeyer, Logan Gentile, and Sheila Willard.
1
Katie Simmons, Sub-Saharan Africa Makes Progress Against Poverty but Has Long
Way to Go, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/09/24/sub-saharan-africa-makes-progress-against-poverty-but-has-long-wayto-go/; Marco Pani, Resilient Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Despite Strong Headwinds,
INT’L MONETARY FUND (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/car042815a.htm.
2
See Simmons, supra note 1 (“Today, the percentage of people living on less than
$1.25 a day in Sub-Saharan Africa (41 [percent]) is more than twice as high as any other
region (such as Southern Asia, with 17 [percent]).”).
3
See Daniel Ayalew Ali, Klaus Deininger & Markus Goldstein, Environmental and
Gender Impacts of Land Tenure Regularization in Africa: Pilot Evidence from Rwanda,
110 J. DEV. ECON. 262, 267 (2014),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3527/WPS5765.pdf?seque
nce=1 (describing Rwanda’s high population density, the dependence of 85 percent of its
population on agriculture to survive, and the “environmental challenges” caused by
farmers who had to “push into marginal lands, clear forests, and cultivate steep hillsides
without proper soil and water conservation”).
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poverty.4 For the millions of people without access to land, landlessness is
synonymous with poverty.5
Another incongruity is less obvious but nearly as important—for all of
Africa’s natural resources and biological diversity,6 its environment is
threatened by deforestation,7 desertification,8 soil degradation,9 erosion,10
4

See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Voluntary Guidelines
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context
of National Food Security, FAO, at v (2012),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf [hereinafter FAO, Voluntary
Guidelines] (“[p]eople can be condemned to a life of hunger and poverty if they lose their
tenure rights to their homes, land, fisheries and forests”); Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, Land Tenure and Rural Development, FAO, at 1
(2002), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4307E/y4307E00.pdf [hereinafter FAO, Land
Tenure] (“Land tenure problems are often an important contributor to food insecurity, to
restricted livelihood opportunities, and therefore to poverty.”); see also Philomena
Kebec, REDD+: Climate Justice or a New Face of Manifest Destiny? Lessons Drawn
from the Indigenous Struggle to Resist Colonization of Ojibwe Forests in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 552, 556 (2015),
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2886&context=wmlr (citing
Olivier De Schutter, U.N. Special Reapporteur on the right to food, who argues that land
cannot be treated the same as other commodities bin agricultural economies, landlessness
causes poverty).
5
See Kebec, supra note 4, at 556.
6
See Joseph Opio-Odongo, Africa Environment Outlook 3: Summary for Policy
Makers, UNEP, at 10 (2013), http://www.unep.org/pdf/aeo3.pdf (depicting Africa’s
biodiversity hotspots, listing traditional medicinal cures, and noting that “fruits,
vegetables, honey, spices, oils, bush meat, fish, edible worms [yum!] and mushrooms
[can be found] found in Africa’s ecosystems [that] contribute to food and nutrition
security on the continent,” and that in Zimbabwe alone 50 types of mushrooms, 25 kinds
of fruit, and 50 vegetable species are harvested from the wild).
7
See Theodore Panayotou, Environmental Degradation at Different Stages of Economic
Development, in BEYOND RIO: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND SUSTAINABLE
LIVELIHOODS IN THE THIRD WORLD 20 (Iftikhar Ahmed & Jacobus A. Doeleman eds.,
1995) (observing that forests are “particularly vulnerable” as developing countries begin
to industrialize “when the rural sector is heavily taxed to generate a surplus for industrial
growth and while a protected industry generates very few jobs for the induced ‘surplus’
rural labor.”).
8
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, Addressing Desertification,
Land Degradation and Drought in Africa, UNCCD, http://www.unccd.int/en/regionalaccess/Africa/Pages/alltext.aspx (last visited July 10, 2016) (“For many African
countries, fighting land degradation and desertification and mitigating the effects of
drought are prerequisites for economic growth and social progress. Increasing sustainable
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water shortages,11 and species extinction.12 Once again, land tenure
insecurity plays an important role, and a heightened awareness and
implementation of secure tenure would allow communities to take great
strides in protecting Africa’s environment.13
Alleviating poverty and protecting the natural environment are
interconnected and critical elements for sustainable development in SubSaharan Africa.14 This paper explores how secure land tenure addresses
both elements, with a particular focus on the latter, exploring the ways that
secure land tenure can sustainably protect the natural environment in Subland management and building resilience to drought in Africa can have profound positive
impacts that reach from the local to the global level.”); see generally Kenta Ikazaki,
Desertification and a New Countermeasure in the Sahel, West Africa, 61 SOIL SCI. AND
PLANT NUTRITION 372, 372-383 (2015).
9
Keijiro Otsuka & Frank Place, Land Tenure and Agricultural Intensification in SubSaharan Africa, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AFRICA AND ECONOMICS: VOL. II,
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 289, 292 (Celestin Monga & Justin Yifu Lin eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Otsuka & Place, Land Tenure] (recognizing that soil degradation will occur
“until secure individualized land rights institutions are established to induce investment
in land improvement.”); Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 23 (stating that 500,000 square
kilometers of land have been degraded since 1950, and that 60 percent of the population
in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Mali live on degraded land).
10
Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 23 (citing studies indicating that African soil losses are
between two and forty percent, the worst in the world).
11
Id. at 19. Although Africa has many river basins and extensive supplies of
groundwater, and although portions of the continent receive heavy rainfall, its water
supplies are distributed unevenly across the continent and water scarcity is expected to
increase from 47 percent in 2000 to 65 percent in 2025. Moreover, much of SSA lacks
safe drinking water; indeed, almost one-third of the 884 million people worldwide who
have no access to safe drinking water live in sub-Saharan Africa. Id. at 20.
12
Id. at 10-11.
13
Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998)
(finding that “environmental quality and economic growth rates are greater in regimes
where property rights are well defined than in regimes where property rights are poorly
defined.”).
14
Emeka Polycarp Amechi, Poverty, Socio-Political Factors and Degradation of the
Environment in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a Holistic Approach to the Protection
of the Environment and Realisation of the Right to Environment, 5/2 LAW ENV’T & DEV.
J. 107, 111 (2009).
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Saharan Africa.15 To do so, Part I introduces the concepts of land tenure,
tenure security, tenure reform, and the types of land tenure. Part II identifies
two problems flowing from insecure tenure in SSA—poverty and
environmental degradation. Part III discusses the benefits of tenure security
generally, including how it helps alleviate poverty. Part IV narrows the
focus and explores how tenure security helps protect the environment.
Finally, Part V proposes specific policies that promote tenure security and,
by extension, a reduction in poverty and protection of the Sub-Saharan
environment.

II. THE CONCEPTS OF LAND TENURE, TENURE SECURITY, AND
TENURE REFORM
Communities have long recognized some form of land tenure by using
both written law and oral traditions.16 Land rights first emerged as society
transitioned to “sedentary agriculture to encourage investment . . . in the
form of land clearing or establishment of perennials.”17 According to the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),
Land tenure refers to rules and norms and institutions that govern
how, when and where people access land or are excluded from
such access. Land tenure security refers to enforceable claims on
land, with the level of enforcement ranging from national laws to
local village rules, which again are supported by national
15

FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 3 (recognizing that environmental sustainability is
both affected by and has an impact on land tenure).
16
Johannes M. Renger, Institutional, Communal, and Individual Ownership or
Possession of Arable Land in Ancient Mesopotamia from the End of the Fourth to the
End of the First Millennium B.C., 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 269, 269 (1995) (noting that
“we are able to observe land tenure systems in varying degrees of accurateness from the
end of the fourth millennium B.C. until Late Achaemenid times towards the end of the
first millennium B.C.”; the written nature of these records is discussed throughout
Renger’s article); Peter Ho & Max Spoor, Whose Land? The Political Economy of Land
Titling in Transitional Economies, 23 LAND USE POL’Y 580, 581 (2006) (observing the
“unwritten and fluid features” of the historic customary tenure rules).
17
Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 264.
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regulatory frameworks. It refers to people’s recognized ability to
control and manage land–using it and disposing of its products as
well as engaging in such transactions as the transferring or leasing
of land.18
Land tenure security is defined by many factors, such as how long a land
right lasts, whether a right to land will be protected from those who threaten
it, and how much control an owner has over her land.19 More simply, tenure
“defines property and what a person or group can do with it—their property
rights.”20
Four types of land tenure are common: private tenure, where land is
owned by an individual or corporation; customary or communal tenure,
where land is owned in common by a group of individuals, such as a village
or a tribe; state tenure, where land is government owned or the property
rights are assigned to some government authority; and open access, where
specific rights are not assigned to anyone, and no one can be excluded from
using the land.21
Of the four types of land tenure, customary tenure is the least well
known.

Through

customary

tenure

systems,

many

Sub-Saharan

22

communities have some form of land tenure, which is rarely recognized or
18

International Fund for Agricultural Development, Improving Access to Land & Tenure
Security, at 27 (2008),
http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/Land%20Access%20Rural%20Communities.pdf
(internal citation omitted) [hereinafter IFAD, Improving Access]; see also World
Resources Institute, World Resources 2005: The Wealth of the Poor—Managing
Ecosystems to Fight Poverty, WORLD RESOURCES SERIES, at 57 (2005),
http://pdf.wri.org/wrr05_lores.pdf [hereinafter World Resources] (noting that “secure
tenure” is the “certainty that a person’s rights to continuous use of land or resources will
be recognized and protected against challenges from individuals or the state”).
19
See IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 27.
20
World Resources, supra note 18, at 56.
21
Id. at 59; FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 8.
22
Approximately 90 percent of the land in Sub-Saharan Africa, other than national parks
and private land, is administered under customary tenure. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Time to
Legally Recognize Customary Land Rights, USAID (2013),
http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/commentary/2013/08/in-sub-saharan-africa-time-to-
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protected by the government.23 Deeply rooted in indigenous culture,
customary tenure usually provides security through extralegal or informal
community frameworks.24 For example, lifetime land tenure security in
Senegal, Chad, and Mauritania is guaranteed and informally regulated
through rules of inheritance determined by Sharia law.25 More than 50
percent of the peri-urban African population live in areas with informal
systems of land tenure, with highly insecure land rights.26 These forms of
customary land tenure do not usually involve any form of legal titling or
registration, as most titled properties are in urban cities, which make up less
than one percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s land area.27 At the same time,
some communal tenure systems include strong household or individual
rights to use a resource or plot of land, and some community tenure systems

legally-recognize-customary-land-rights); Rebecca Tapscott, Maximizing Achievements
in Human Rights Development: Arguments for a Rights-Based Approach to Land Tenure
Reform, XXVII PRAXIS FLETCHER J. OF HUM. SEC. 26, 30 (2012).
23
Roy Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century: New
Challenges, New Responses, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 763, 765–66 (May 2006)
(hereinafter Prosterman, Land Reform) (discussing plight of the poor who hold rights
recognized by customary law but are not protected by the nation’s formal laws); Liz
Alden Wily, ‘The Law is to Blame’: The Vulnerable Status of Common Law Property
Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 42 DEV. & CHANGE 733, 733 (2011) (“national land laws
have generally . . . den[ied] that customary rights amount to real property rights,
deserving of protection”); World Resources, supra note 18, at 60-61 (recognizing the
continuing importance of community tenure systems at the local level versus national
politics and institutions and the uneasy balance of power between them); see also Kebec,
supra note 4, at 556 (discussing indigenous peoples’ customary title in Central and South
America).
24
Kebec, supra note 4, at 556; World Resources, supra note 18, at 59-60.
25
Liz Alden Wily, Customary Land Tenure in the Modern World - Rights to Resources
in Crisis: Reviewing the Fate of Customary Tenure in Africa - Brief #1 of 5, at 2 (Nov.
2011),
https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/7713/customary%20land%20tenu
re%20in%20the%20modern%20world.pdf?sequence=1.
26
Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, THE WORLD BANK, at xxv (2003),
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/34919/landpoliciesexecsummary.pdf.
27
Wily, supra note 23, at 2.
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can be as secure as titled private property.28 Outsiders often confuse
“communal tenure” with “open access” and opine that communal tenure
property will be subject to the tragedy of the commons—the theory that
natural resources held in common will be overused.29 This tragedy of the
commons theory is particularly applicable to open access tenure, where no
one is excluded from using the available resources.30 It is less applicable,
however, to communal tenure where the community usually excludes
outsiders and enforces limits to prevent overuse and increase the net product
for its own benefit.31
“Tenure reform” differs from “land reform” in that, whereas land reform
often involves redistribution of land from the state or wealthy landowners to
the poor, tenure reform adjusts the rights to possess and use land.32 Tenure
reform often works to strengthen tenure rights by making such rights legally
enforceable.33

III. TWO FRUITS OF INSECURE TENURE: POVERTY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
Like a burgeoning tree without firm roots, economic growth without land
tenure security precludes sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa,
creating particular consequences for both the social and the natural
environment.34 An in-depth understanding of how insecure land tenure
28

World Resources, supra note 18, at 59; see also Kebec, supra note 4, at 556 (2015)
(discussing the “complex system of allocating resources fairly among bands and family
groups” amongst the Ojibwe in North America).
29
World Resources, supra note 18, at 60.
30
Id.
31
Scott J. Shackelford, Neither Magic Bullet Nor Lost Cause: Land Titling and the
Wealth of Nations, 21 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.J. 272, 299 (2014); see also World Resources,
supra note 18, at 60, identifying eight “principles for successful communal management
of natural resources.”
32
World Resources, supra note 18, at 57.
33
Id. at 58.
34
See IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 4 (listing pressures that “threaten the
land and tenure security – and hence the food security and livelihoods – of millions of
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devastates both the environment and those who depend on its bounty
provides the requisite contextual framework in which to implement policies
designed to inspire and promote land tenure security.
A. Tenure Insecurity in an Agricultural Economy Institutionalizes Poverty
It is not difficult to understand that “secure access to productive land is
critical to the millions of poor people living in rural areas and depending on
agriculture, livestock or forests for their livelihood.”35 Without reliable
access to land and its produce, the poor are more susceptible to hunger and
poverty; insecure access to land precludes their ability to invest in
productive agricultural activities or to sustainably manage their resources,
thus reducing their prospects for better livelihoods.36 More peripherally, but
just as importantly, insecure land tenure makes the poor’s participation in
democratic government and equitable relations with the rest of their society
much more challenging.37 Specifically, insecure land tenure and the
consequent lack of property rights prevent the collection of taxes by the
government and undermine the reciprocal exchange of tax revenue and
resultant social services.38 Consequently, many citizens are excluded from

poor rural people whose access to land was not previously under threat. This in turn
raises the risks of environmental degradation and social conflict”).
35
Id.; Elisabeth Wickeri, Land is Life, Land is Power: Landlessness, Exclusion, and
Deprivation in Nepal, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 930, 998, 1014-16 (2011).
36
FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 5-6; IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at
5-6, 13.
37
IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 1.
38
Paula Ximena Meijia & Vincent Castel, Could Oil Shine like Diamonds? How
Botswana Avoided the Resource Curse and Its Implications for a New Libya, AFR. DEV.
BANK 3(Oct. 2012),
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Could%20Oil%20S
hine%20like%20Diamonds%20%20How%20Botswana%20Avoided%20the%20Resource%20Curse%20and%20its%20I
mplications%20for%20a%20New%20Libya.pdf.
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state revenue creation, which then terminates the social contract between
the state and such citizens.39
Instead of protecting property rights and securing land tenure for those in
poverty, the governments of developing countries often exclude the poor—
either intentionally, due to corruption or prejudice, or unintentionally, due
to bureaucracy, instability, or ineptitude.40 As resources in the world
become more valuable, Africa has drawn considerable attention from
investors who often seek (and gain) approval from governments to rent or
purchase land.41 While much of Africa’s arable land is claimed by
communities through customary land tenure, land rights are often either not
recognized or ignored by the state.42 It is thus common for the state to seize
this land and lease or sell it to an international corporation or foreign
government, leaving the customary tenure holders who previously lived or
39

Id.
See Tapscott, supra note 22, at 36 (Tapscott explains that the governments of
developing countries are disinclined to help marginalized peoples who “typically have
different political, religious, or social interests; they are marginalized for a reason.”
Tapscott further warns that “in resource-poor economies, governments might be wary of
giving any additional rights to citizens that could be politically or financially costly in the
future.”).
41
Rachel Knight, Statutory Recognition of Customary Land Rights in Africa: An
Investigation into Best Practices for Lawmaking and Implementation, FAO, at ix (2010)
(“scarcity is being exacerbated by wealthy nations and private investors who are
increasingly seeking to acquire large tracts of land in Africa for agro-industrial
enterprises and forestry and mineral exploitation.”).
42
Id. (observing that “rural communities often have little power to contest such grants”
because they “operate under customary law and have no formal legal title to their lands or
documentation of their claims.”). Nevertheless, the governmental perspective is not
always so nefarious: the challenge of what to do with land under customary tenure is a
tricky one. As two scholars observed, “any national government that has embarked on the
path of economic development is confronted with the question of what position informal
institutions, such as customary and informal land use arrangements, should be accorded
relative to the formal, statutory institutional framework. In land registration the question
is whether to disregard or recognize land claims that predate the statutory legal system.
Due to its unwritten and fluid features, customary tenure is generally seen as
irreconcilable with a modernized economy that needs registered plots with clearly
established ownership for efficient land market transactions.” Ho & Spoor, supra note 16,
at 581.
40
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relied upon the land for their survival with no remedy and few options.43 As
a result, urban populations are booming but certainly not blooming—“the
majority of urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa live under slum
conditions, without durable housing or legal rights to their land or
businesses.”44
Meanwhile, the rural poor often have limited access to land for pasturing
animals, growing food, and gathering medicinal plants45 and forest
products. These “landed poor” remain poor because they have little land and
because their right to the land is insecure.46 The property of the rural poor is
largely undocumented, “making it highly vulnerable to land grabbing and
expropriation with poor compensation.”47 For these poor, formalizing a
legal right to property is frequently both unaffordable and overwhelmingly
difficult, especially in countries with broken and corrupt governments.48 As
a result, “extralegal” or informal systems remain prevalent in Sub-Saharan

43

Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food, 49
STAN. J. INT’L L. 101, 103-05 (2013) (discussing a land deal between Ethiopia and Saudi
Arabia. The Ethiopian government claimed no one lived on or used the land, but an
investigation showed that villagers were forcibly removed from the land and that they
only learned about the deal when bulldozers showed up to clear the area. The villagers
were reportedly told, when they asked why they had to move off their ancestral land, that
“you don’t have any land, only government has land.”).
44
Stephanie Hanson, Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa, COUNS. ON FOREIGN REL.
(Oct. 1, 2007) http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/urbanization-sub-saharanafrica/p14327.
45
Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 10 (finding that 80 percent of Africa’s rural population
depends upon the continent’s biodiversity as a source for its traditional medicines).
46
World Resources, supra note 18, at 56.
47
How Africa Can Transform Land Tenure, Revolutionize Agriculture, and End
Poverty, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2013/07/22/how-africa-can-transform-land-tenure-revolutionize-agriculture-endpoverty.
48
This article follows the custom of other authors in the literature and uses the terms
“formalization” and “land titling” interchangeably. See, e.g., Shackelford, supra note 31,
at 275 n.16.
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Africa, causing Africans to miss economic opportunity, the benefits of
formalization, or an appreciation of assets.49
Thus, the absence of tenure security leaves many Sub-Saharan Africans
without an opportunity to harness resources to sustainably alleviate poverty.
This same tenure insecurity greatly impairs their ability to protect the
natural environment.50 It is increasingly understood that “long-term, secure
rights to land set the stage for environmental stewardship and sustainable
farming practices.”51
B. Tenure Insecurity Precludes Incentives and Opportunities for
Environmental Protection
It is well recognized that for all the riches of Africa’s natural resources52
and its relative abundance of arable land,53 the continent’s natural
environment is increasingly threatened by a number of dangers. These
threats include poverty; rapid population growth; soil degradation,
deforestation, and desertification; a global land “rush” for property; weak
and corrupt governance; a land “productivity gap”; and insecure community
land tenure.54 Three of these threats—population growth, the global land
rush, and insecure community tenure—are discussed in this section due to
their close connection with land tenure security.

49
Land Tenure, Property Rights, and Economic Growth in Rural Areas, USAID, at 2,
http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/USAID_Land_Tenure_Economic_Gro
wth_Issue_Brief-061214.pdf.
50
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772.
51
Id.
52
Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 10.
53
Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 262; see also Opio-Odongo, supra note 6,
at 22 (recognizing that Africa’s supply of arable land has the capacity to produce
sufficient food for the majority of the continent’s population).
54
See, e.g., Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 262; Dustin Miller & Eyob
Tekalign Tolina, Land to the Tiller Redux: Unlocking Ethiopia’s Land Potential, 13
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 347, 350 (2008); Knight, supra note 41, at v, ix; Akin L. Mabogunje,
The Environmental Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 ENV’T 4, 5-8 (May 1995).
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1. Sub-Sahar an Afr ica’s Rapid Population Gr owth
Sub-Saharan Africa’s population has skyrocketed from 228 million
people in 1960 to over 1 billion people in 2015.55 At the end of the colonial
period, social services expanded rapidly, particularly in the areas of
education and health care.56 Due to these improvements, Sub-Saharan
Africa’s infant mortality has dropped significantly, leading to a surge in
population growth.57 While Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth could
negatively impact the environment, most of the sub-continent still has a
relatively low population density.58 Some of the best agricultural land is
largely unsettled, while the areas that are less suitable for agriculture are
more densely populated.59 Even in relatively densely populated areas,
environmental damage most commonly occurs where three circumstances
are met: (1) the population is greater than 500 people per square kilometer;
(2) the area itself is physically or biologically vulnerable; and (3) the
socioeconomic conditions impede the implementation of conservation
measures.60 Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa’s rapid population growth becomes
much more of an environmental concern in conjunction with other
environmental threats, such as the degradation of soil fertility due to the
intensification of agriculture without replenishment of nutrients.61

55

Sub-Saharan Africa Data, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/region/SSA
(last visited October 6, 2016).
56
Mabogunje, supra note 54, at 6.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 8.
59
Id. at 31.
60
Id. at 32.
61
See Keijiro Otsuka & Frank Place, Evolutionary Changes in Land Tenure and
Agricultural Intensification in Sub-Saharan Africa 1 (2013) [hereinafter Otsuka & Place,
Evolutionary Changes], http://www.grips.ac.jp/r-center/wp-content/uploads/13-22.pdf.
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2. The Global “Land Rush” and State Concessions
Another significant threat to Sub-Saharan African environmental
sustainability, which is directly related to land tenure security, is state
appropriation of land—particularly land held by customary tenure—and the
award of the land to foreign investors for purposes of mineral extraction and
large-scale commercial farming.62 Over the last decade, attempts to
purchase or lease agricultural lands in developing countries, such as those in
Africa, have grown exponentially.63 One study documents the yearly growth
of such agreements to have jumped from an average of about a four million
hectares worth of growth in 2008 to more than 56 million hectares before
the end of 2009, with the rates unlikely to slow.64 Another study indicated
that about 60 million hectares of farmland were acquired in 2009—an area
about the size of Arizona and New Mexico combined.65 In 2010, the going
rate for such land acquisitions was approximately four dollars per acre per
year.66 Such appropriations are often made without the consent or even
knowledge of those most affected by the change—the residents who lived
on the land.67

62
Kidane Mengisteab, Environmental Degradation in the Greater Horn of Africa: Some
Impacts and Future Implications, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE,
http://www.twn.my/title2/resurgence/2011/251-252/cover02.htm (last visited April 25,
2016); Ailey Kaiser Hughes, Threats to Land Tenure in Rural Liberia, WORLD RES.
INST. 3 (Feb. 2013).
63
Narula, supra note 43, at 105 (2013); Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 22 (estimating
that Africa supplies 70 percent of the land leased or purchased by foreign entities to
produce agricultural crops).
64
KLAUS DEININGER & DEREK BYERLEE, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND:
CAN IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? xiv, 14 (The World Bank
2011).
65
Narula, supra note 43, at 106 & 106 n.35, 36.
66
Id. at 105.
67
Hughes, supra note 62, at 4; see also World Resources, supra note 18, at 57 (noting
that “Government agencies, corporations, large landowners, poor farmers, indigenous
peoples, and different ethnic or cultural groups frequently make overlapping and
conflicting claims on the same set of natural resources. Unfortunately, unless the tenure
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Such appropriations cause environmental damages both directly and
indirectly. Appropriations cause direct environmental problems because
large tracts of land are cleared, leading to deforestation and a decline in
vegetative cover, with soil erosion, desiccation, and desertification
following soon after.68 Less immediately, pollutants are emitted into the air,
water, and soil.69 Appropriations indirectly cause environmental problems
by taking land away from smallholder farmers who previously used the land
to raise their livestock, grow their crops, and harvest natural resources such
as coffee, cocoa, and rubber.70 These small farmers are thus required to
more intensively farm their remaining land, leading to overuse and soil
degradation.71
3. Insecur e Customar y Land Tenur e
As serious as the global land rush is, even this threat to the environment
of Sub-Saharan Africa is eclipsed by insecure customary land tenure. The
amount of land under customary land tenure and the limitations of such
systems, specifically its inability to withstand governmental actions to seize
and sell the property, are readily apparent.72 Unfortunately, customary land
tenure has further limitations. Whereas individuals with secure property
rights may use their land as collateral, individuals with customary tenure

rights of the poor are secure, they usually lose out in these conflicts over competing
claims”).
68
Joachim von Braun & Ruth Meinzen-Dick (2009), “Land Grabbing” by Foreign
Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities, IFPRI 3-4 (Apr. 2009),
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/ifpri_land_grabbing
_apr_09-2.pdf.
69
Joseph Fargione, Jason Hill, David Tilman, Stephen Polasky & Peter
Hawthorne, Land Clearing and Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 SCI.1235, 1235–37,
(2008), doi:10.1126/science.1152747.
70
For guidelines on dealing with concessions (or “large-scale transactions”), see FAO,
Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21-23.
71
Mengisteab, supra note 62; Hughes, supra note 62, at 3-5.
72
See supra notes 22, 23 & 67 and accompanying text.
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have no economic assets, and thus no collateral upon which they can rely to
obtain credit to invest in equipment and improvements.73
Furthermore, while traditional communities have inherent strengths that
lead to environmental protections, they also have certain weaknesses that
cause environmental sustainability to break down.74 Uncultivated land in
customary tenure systems, such as forests and pastures, is often in effect
open access, even where the land may be informally managed by village
leaders or by other traditional arrangements.75 Such open access has been
found to be a major cause of deforestation and disappearance of communal
grazing land.76 Even where individuals in customary communities could
theoretically obtain deeds, it is often too complicated and requires too much
time and expensive for the individuals to obtain the deeds.77 Thus, while
customary tenure systems may have some value, in most current
applications they are much more likely to fall short when it comes to either
helping the poor or protecting the environment. With recognition of the
negative precipitants of insecure tenure security and the shortcomings of
customary tenure systems, this paper now turns to the benefits of secure
land tenure.

73

Mabogunje, supra note 54, at 32.
FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 24 (“Insecure land tenure is linked to poor land
use which in turn leads to environmental degradation”).
75
Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 2-3; FAO, Land Tenure,
supra note 4, at 24. “The notion of unsustainable use of common property resources
received considerable publicity through the ‘tragedy of the commons’ described by
Hardin. This analysis of over-exploitation has been faulted because it was based on the
unrestrained ability to use open-access property systems rather than the communitycontrolled access of common property resources. However, at times common property
tenure systems have been transformed into open access systems, for example, when a
communal system becomes too weak to prevent the communal grazing lands from being
used by people from outside the community.” Id.
76
Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 2-3; FAO, Land Tenure,
supra note 4, at 24.
77
Hughes, supra note 62, at 3.
74
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IV. TENURE SECURITY’S BENEFITS FOR THE POOR
Secure land tenure has many identifiable benefits, from increasing land
protection to decreasing the flight of the rural poor to constantly expanding
city slums. This section describes eight general benefits of secure land
tenure.
First, land tenure security leads to an increase in agricultural
production.78 Where a farmer knows his tenure is secure, he is much more
willing to spend time and money to practice all the techniques required to
raise a productive crop: buying good quality seeds, planting carefully,
cultivating the crops, removing weeds and pests, fertilizing the soil,
protecting the crops from pests, watering the fields as necessary, and taking
all the other little steps necessary to achieve a maximum yield.79 A farmer
with secure tenure will also think toward the future and be willing to invest
in his land.80 For example, he could plant coffee, rubber, or fruit trees that
will not yield a harvest for a number of years but will, when mature,
produce a greater return than if the farmer had only thought about shortterm returns.81 These efforts will put the farmer in the best position to
harvest a much larger crop than one who has made no such efforts.82
Second, a farmer with secure land tenure is much more likely to improve
and maintain his property, whereas one who may lose the fruit of his labors
at any time has no such incentive.83 Since at least the time of William
78

World Resources, supra note 18, at 59.
See Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769.
80
Frank Place & Keijiro Otsuka, Land Tenure Systems and Their Impacts on
Agricultural Investments and Productivity in Uganda, 38 J. OF DEV. STUD. 107-09, 121,
125 (2002).
81
World Resources, supra note 18, at 59; FAO, Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 4, at
20.
82
See Shackelford, supra note 31, at 278 (observing that “the incentives created by
private property rights are, assuming perfect enforcement, critical to enticing individuals
to maximize the benefit of their land”).
83
World Resources, supra note 18, at 57; Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New
Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 673 (2001)
79
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Blackstone, the law has recognized that enforcing property rights
incentivizes owners “to make socially desirable investments in improving
assets.”84 Thus, property owners, including farmers, with secure land tenure
consider what valuable improvements can and should be made to the land,
“view[ing] maintenance expenditures and the like as investments in existing
assets.”85 A farmer with established land rights on agricultural land is more
likely to consider longer-term improvements such as manuring, rotating
crop, conserving soil, and planting trees.86 In particular, a farmer secure in
his tenure may add wells and irrigation pipes or trenches to transport water
to the fields, drainage ditches or tile to remove excess rainfall, trees to serve
as windbreaks, and swales and terraces to prevent erosion.87
Third, land tenure security leads to the practice of sustainable
agriculture.88 A farmer employing slash-and-burn techniques—where the
(observing that private owners “bear the costs of poor management decisions and have
strong incentives to maintain their property”).
84
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL. II: OF THE
RIGHTS OF THINGS 979 (1766).
85
Adler, supra note 83, at 673; Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769.
86
Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 3 (citing studies indicating
that due to secure land tenure, tree cover increased on farms in Uganda and that farmers
now grow trees on the edges of crop fields in East Africa); Tapscott, supra note 22, at 35.
87
World Resources, supra note 18, at 57; see also Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra
note 3, at 272, 274 (illustrating how farmers whose land rights were regularized under
Rwanda’s land tenure reform were twice as likely “to have initiated or maintained soil
conservation investments in structures such as bunds, terraces, and check dams” and that
female heads of households with secure tenure were three times as likely to engage in soil
conservation measures); Berhanu Gebremedhin & Scott M. Swinton, Investment in Soil
Conservation in Northern Ethiopia: The Role of Land Tenure Security and Public
Programs, 29 AG. ECON. 69, 82 (2003) (concluding that “tenure security encourages land
improvements, notably the use of conservation practices”); Petr Sklenicka et. al, Owner
or Tenant: Who Adopts Better Soil Conservation Practices?, 47 LAND USE POL’Y 253,
257 (2015) (reporting the results of a study showing that erosion control measures were
adopted in a significantly more responsible way by land owners than by tenants).
88
See Sklenicka et. al, supra note 87, at 253, 257-59 (concluding that “land tenure
security is widely considered to be a fundamental factor in motivating farmers to adopt
sustainable land management practices”); Gebremedhin & Swinton, supra note 87, at 83
(“Land titling and legal enforcement of title are fundamental for the widespread adoption
and sustained use of conservation practices”).
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farmer hacks a plot of earth from the forest, burns the area, and plants a
crop for one season—must move on to the next season, as the soil is now
nutrient-poor and he likely has no legitimate claim to the land.89 In contrast,
a farmer with land tenure security has the opportunity and motivation to
practice sustainable agriculture.90 A farmer who expects to own his property
indefinitely is more likely not only to invest in his property,91 but also to use
disease-resistant plants and to choose native, drought-tolerant crops.92 To
allow for natural soil regeneration, a farmer who has secure land tenure is
more likely to practice techniques such as crop rotation and leaving his
fields fallow.93
Fourth, due to each of the above factors—an increase in agricultural
production, better property maintenance, and the practice of sustainable
agriculture—a farmer with secure land tenure is certain to receive a much
better return on his investment.94 These advantages are especially
pronounced on smaller, family-operated farms, where “the highly motivated
application of intensive family labor to a small piece of land owned or held
securely by that family is precisely what makes economic sense.”95 These
families also reap the nutritional benefit of retaining a significant portion of
crops grown on the land, which would have otherwise been transferred to
the landowner or landlord.96
89

See, e.g., Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 5-6 (noting that
land may be put into fallow for twenty to thirty years to restore soil quality after only one
or two seasons of cultivation).
90
See Sklenicka et. al, supra note 87, at 254 (finding that of the four types of sustainable
farming practices tested in their study, all were adopted in a significantly more
responsible way by owners of property than they were by mere tenants).
91
See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
92
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769; see also ROY L. PROSTERMAN &
JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 36 (1987).
93
Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 3.
94
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770.
95
Id. at 769-70.
96
Id. at 770; Tapscott, supra note 22, at 35, 41, 42. But see Michael Roth & Dwight
Haase, Land Tenure Security and Agricultural Performance in Southern
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Fifth, secure land tenure increases the value of the property. Land will be
worth more if it is more productive, has better returns on investments, and is
better maintained.97 Land with secure tenure is also more valuable because,
unlike unregistered land which is sometimes sold simultaneously to
multiple buyers, the buyer of land with secure, registered title can be certain
that he will receive that for which he has paid.98
Sixth, owners of land with secure tenure can use that land as security
(“capital”) to obtain credit.99 The use of such credit allows the owner to
purchase additional improvements for the land, better agricultural products,
improved equipment for the operation, and other items needed by the
farmer.100 Formalized tenure also serves as a safety net and a secure
investment in times of financial crisis or in an uncertain economy.101

Africa, BASIS (1998), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacl422.pdf (last visited June 9,
2016) (arguing that other research efforts have failed to factually prove that land tenure
security results in better investment returns and discussing a detailed research effort
focused on land tenure security and agricultural performance in Southern Africa, which
concluded that “regardless of whether communal tenure systems are unproductive,
upgrading tenure to individualized freehold does not ensure improved agricultural
performance . . . the ‘real constraints’ on agricultural productivity are not land tenure but
infrastructure, market efficiency, and production technology.”).
97
Tapscott, supra note 22, at 36.
98
See Karol Boudreaux & Daniel Sacks, Land Tenure Security and Agricultural
Productivity 3 (2009),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Land_Tenure_and_Agriculture.pdf (noting that “if
formal transactions are allowed, sellers can command greater prices for their land”).
99
World Resources, supra note 18, at 59, 62; Shackelford, supra note 31, at 301
(observing that “the incentive structure of private property rights . . . give[s] the owner a
pecuniary interest in refraining from destructive practices and that in turn may be used to
catalyze the creation of capital markets”); Wickeri, supra note 35, at 998.
100
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 33 (“Titling untitled agricultural land and allocating water
rights to farmers and other rural dwellers would provide them with access to capital
markets, thereby increasing on-farm investments that improve agricultural productivity
and help to arrest the erosion of the resource base”); Prosterman, Land Reform, supra
note 23, at 772-73.
101
Tapscott, supra note 22, at 36.
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Moreover, studies have shown that investment doubles on land with secure
tenure.102
Seventh, for each of the reasons above, land tenure security results in
increased wealth, both for individuals and the national overall.103 It is
recognized that “property in land has been a principle source of wealth and
also a guarantor of individual liberty.”104 The Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations acknowledges that “countries that have
invested in the technical and institutional infrastructure required for
efficient and equitable land tenure administration, and that have been in the
forefront of ensuring property rights for both men and women, have
developed much faster with a much higher level of food security, health and
welfare.”105
The same principles apply on a national level. One of the detrimental
effects of insecure land tenure is soil degradation, which has a significant
effect on the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP):
The productivity loss due to soil degradation is pronounced in
SSA. As much as 25 percent of land productivity has been lost due
to degradation in the second half of the twentieth century in Africa.
Because of the importance of agriculture to African economies,
this has cost between 1 percent and 9 percent of GDP, depending
on the country.106

102

World Resources, supra note 18, at 59.
See Shackelford, supra note 31, at 285-86 (“The developed world got rich . . . because
of advanced property systems that allowed entrepreneurs to realize the full potential of
their fixed assets, and in turn led to the development of banking and capital markets.”);
Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental Regulation,
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 746 (2013) (“A strong system of private property rights
promotes economic wellbeing, and also protects liberty and autonomy.”).
104
Eagle, supra note 103, at 14.
105
FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 5.
106
Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 19 (internal citations
omitted).
103
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When land tenure is secure, landowners have a greater incentive to use
sustainable agriculture practices, leading to greater production and therefore
higher incomes.107 When agricultural families receive higher incomes, they
have a greater ability to purchase goods and services in the marketplace,
which also creates more demand for non-farm employment.108 In this way, a
“broad-based distribution of land assets not only benefits the poor but
becomes a solid basis for sustained and inclusive economic growth.”109
Finally, tenure security leads to “grassroots empowerment” and
democracy, reduced social unrest and instability, and reduced urban
migration.110 Tenure security empowers landowners by removing
hierarchies of control, allowing landowners to participate directly in the
marketplace and political process.111 This shift represents a grassroots,
marketplace-driven, and democratic redistribution of power, in which “more
secure and self-confident producers . . . [can] challenge the inertia, elitism,
and

neglect

that

frequently

characterize

the

politics

of

underdevelopment.”112 Tenure security also gives agricultural producers a
stake in local communities—not to mention a sustainable income from the

107

See Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769-70.
Id. at 770; ROY PROSTERMAN, MARY TEMPLE & TIMOTHY HANSTAD, AGRARIAN
REFORM AND GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT: TEN CASE STUDIES 312 (1990); KLAUS
DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 17 (2003).
109
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770.
110
Id. at 768; World Resources, supra note 18, at 62 (citing Hernando de Soto for the
proposition that “the countries that achieve substantial economic progress over the next
two decades will be those that have developed strong property rights institutions” and
arguing that “tenure reform has emerged as an essential component of a broader
sociopolitical transition to greater democracy and decentralization in developing
countries”).
111
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770-71.
112
Id. at 771; see also Land Policies for Growth and Property Reduction, WORLD BANK
POL’Y RES. REPORT, at xvii (2008),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/2003/06/2457830/land-policies-growthpoverty-reduction (arguing that widespread land ownership strengthens democratic
accountability).
108
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land—thereby reducing, if not eliminating, the pressure to migrate to urban
areas.113

V. HOW TENURE SECURITY HELPS PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
While the general benefits of land tenure security are relatively well
known, there has been much less discussion of how tenure security protects
the environment. Environmental protection stemming from land tenure
security falls into two categories: a set of protections flowing from the
aforementioned benefits, and a second more general set arising from the
legal status held by a person with secure land tenure.
A. Environmental Protection Flowing from Secure Tenure Benefits
First, tenure security helps protect the environment when a farmer
employs sustainable practices. As discussed in Part III, land tenure security
leads to greater agricultural production.114 This growth in production means
that each acre of land has become more efficient and that fewer additional
acres must be converted from their natural state into pastures or fields.
Second, better-maintained property, with greater improvements and use
of sustainable agriculture, protects the environment directly—fewer
chemicals and agricultural waste run off the land, the nutrient-depleting
slash-and-burn techniques are abandoned,115 and wastes are reused.116
Secure, transferable tenure provides incentive—even for someone
unconcerned about or adverse to environmental protection—to consider
environmental concerns, because “despoiling the resource [the property]
may reduce its value in the eyes of potential buyers.”117 Tenure security
stimulates land practices that protect the environment.
113

Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772.
See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
115
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772.
116
See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
117
Adler, supra note 83, at 670.
114
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Third, many of the benefits of secure land tenure, such as increased
returns on investments, an increased value of property, an increased ability
to use land as credit, and salability, both together and individually,
contribute to a growth in wealth.118 It is well recognized that those with
more disposable income can and do care more about better protecting the
environment, and that support for environmental measures correlates with
income.119
Finally, and of particular interest to the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
secure land tenure is one of the keys to helping a developing country
shorten the normal progression from a poor, uncontaminated state to a
developed country taking environmental concerns seriously. Economists
have articulated a theory identifying a relationship between income changes
and changes in environmental quality called the “Environmental Kuznets
Curve,” or “EKC.”120 According to this theory, as per capita income
increases, pollution increases, peaks, then decreases, forming an inverted
“U.”121 People with the lowest per capita incomes and who live on a
subsistence basis pollute less because they consume products requiring less
118

Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772-73 (arguing that “by clarifying and
strengthening existing informal and/or weak land rights, governments can create wealth
for the poor and bring ‘dead capital’ to life”).
119
JACK M. HOLLANDER, THE REAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: WHY POVERTY, NOT
AFFLUENCE, IS THE ENVIRONMENT’S NUMBER ONE ENEMY 15-16 (2003) (arguing that
“there is no inherent conflict between a healthy economy and environmental quality;
actually they go hand in hand” and that “an environmentally sustainable future is within
reach for the entire world provided that affluence and democracy replace poverty and
tyranny as the dominant human condition”); Adler, supra note 83, at 681-84 (discussing a
“significant body of literature [that] has found a correlation between economic
improvements and several measures of environmental quality. . . . Wealthier societies
have both the means and the desire to address a wider array of environmental concerns”);
see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
120
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 13; Richard J. Culas, Deforestation and the Environmental
Kuznets Curve: An Institutional Perspective, 61 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 429, 430 (2007).
121
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 13; Culas, supra note 120, at 430; Usama Al-Mulali et. al,
Investigating the Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis in Vietnam, 76 ENERGY
POL’Y 123, 123-24 (2015).

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 1 • 2016

23

24

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

energy and use few if any industrial processes.122 In contrast, people in
developing economies initially pollute more because they use fossil fuels to
light and heat their homes, fuel their transportation, and manufacture
goods.123 In other words, at this stage “environmental damage [is]
increas[ing] due to greater use of natural resources, more emission of
pollutants, the operation of less efficient and relatively dirty technologies,
the high priority given to increases in material output, and disregard for—or
ignorance of—the environmental consequences of growth.”124 Once a
higher level of income is reached, however, emissions level off due to a
combination of innovations in technology and increases in energy derived
from cleaner, renewable sources that make economies more successful.125
For citizens of developing countries eager for not only rising incomes but
also environmental protection, the “inevitability” of the standard EKC
model seems to be depressing in that the standard model requires a period
of environmental degradation in conjunction with “development and
industrialization progress” and rising incomes.126 Additional study,
however, has revealed that countries may “tunnel through” the EKC,
122

See Panayotou, supra note 7, at 25.
Usama Al-Mulali et. al, Investigating the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)
Hypothesis by Utilizing the Ecological Footprint as an Indicator of Environmental
Degradation, 48 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS 315, 320 (2014) [hereinafter Al-Mulali,
Footprint]; Panayotou, supra note 7, at 25.
124
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 17-18 (discussing low demand for environmental
amenities when income is low, but observing that environmental degradation is also low
due to low levels of waste and unimpaired capacities of the environment); see also AlMulali, Footprint, supra note 123, at 319.
125
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 18; Al-Mulali, Footprint, supra note 123, at 316.
126
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 28 (observing a “certain inevitability of environmental
degradation” as a country develops); Bruce Yandle et. al, The Environmental Kuznets
Curve: A Primer, PERC RES. STUDY 02-1, at 4 (May 2002). But see Panayotou, supra
note 7, at 28-30 (suggesting that “resources can best be focused on achieving rapid
economic growth to move quickly through the environmentally unfavorable stage of
development,” while also advancing multiple reasons, including possibly irreversible
environmental damage as well as the impact of environmental degradation on the
economy, why such an approach is unwise).
123
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effectively taking a “shortcut” to higher income and environmental
protection.127 To do so, a country may adopt appropriate policies and
maintain quality institutions allowing it to “leapfrog ecological thresholds”
and thus significantly reduce environmental degradation at low-income
levels and speed up improvements at higher-income levels.128 Similarly,
another study concluded that “improvement in institutions that empower
people through secure property rights for forests will ultimately reduce the
pressure on resources and lead to forestland conservation.”129
Therefore, where a country provides well-defined property rights,
eliminates harmful environmental subsidies, and establishes environmental
standards appropriate for the country’s level of development, the country
can flatten the EKC and achieve its environmental goals faster.130 This
conclusion is buttressed by additional research indicating that there is a
strong relationship between property rights enforcement and environmental
quality.131 This research reveals that strong property-right institutions
support free markets, which in turn leads to growth in income and wealth.132
127
Mohan Munasinghe, Is Environmental Degradation an Inevitable Consequence of
Economic Growth: Tunneling Through the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 29
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 89, 107 (1999) (concluding that “developing countries could learn
important lessons from the experiences of the industrialized nations, and devise
development strategies that can ‘tunnel’ through any potential EKC—thereby avoiding
going through the same stages of growth that involve relatively high (and even
irreversible) levels of damage to the environment”); Hollander, supra note 119, at 15
(observing that “developing societies have a tremendous advantage over yesterday’s
[societies]” because they “do not need to tread through the entire learning experience in
each technology area; instead they can ‘leapfrog’ over the pathways (and mistakes) of the
industrial pioneers and jump straightaway to the environmentally kinder and smarter
technologies of the twenty-first century”).
128
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 14; see also Yandle et. al, supra note 126, at 13-14.
129
Culas, supra note 120, at 436; see also R.T. Deacon, Deforestation and the Rule of
Law in a Cross-Section of Countries, 70 LAND ECON. 414-30 (1994) (discussing
deforestation in connection with land tenure security in the context of 120 countries);
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 34, 36 (tying secure property rights to a flattened EK-curve).
130
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 31-32; Yandle et al., supra note 126, at 14.
131
Yandle et. al, supra note 126, at 14.
132
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770, 772-73.
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As a result, two forces are at work in achieving environmental protection:
the recognition and enforcement of land tenure security leads to higher
income levels, which in turn generates demand for environmental quality.133
B. Environmental Protection through Common Law Remedies
Whereas the benefits of tenure security discussed above tend to deal with
the possessors’ use of the land and resulting wealth, this final benefit of
land tenure security arises due to the owner’s standing before the law. In
other words, the benefit derives from the property-right aspects of the
owner’s tenancy: owners with secure tenure can take legal action against
those who pollute or damage their property.134
Long before any specific environmental regulations existed, citizens used
the common law to protect themselves and their property from damages that
today we would consider environmental contamination.135 The common law
served as a precursor to zoning laws, compelling polluters to locate
themselves away from populated areas.136 More recently, the possibility that
citizens could bring a common law action against polluters provided an
incentive for pollution control technology.137 Today, individuals with secure
property rights may pursue one of several common law actions—trespass,
nuisance, strict liability, and negligence—to protect their property.138

133

Yandle et. al, supra note 126, at 14.
What is Land Tenure, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U. S. (June 9, 2016)
www.fao.org (see section 3.10 and Examples of Rights).
135
Adler, supra note 83, at 670.
136
Eagle, supra note 103, at 749.
137
Id. at 749-50.
138
See, e.g., Mercy O. Erhun, A Legal Framework of Sustainable Environmental
Governance in Nigeria, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL RES. 3(4), at 30 (2015) (listing these four
common law torts as protection for private individuals from environmental pollution).
134
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1. Tr espass
Trespass actions “protect an occupier’s right to enjoy his or her land
without unjustified interference.”139 Trespass is limited to direct or tangible
interference, such as when a person causes a physical object to directly
contact another person’s land,140 and one who commits such interference is
liable for the resulting harm.141 Courts have developed the law of trespass as
an intentional tort and typically construe its limits strictly.142 For example, if
a defendant can prove that he trespassed accidentally, the plaintiff will not
succeed, but the plaintiff may still succeed under a nuisance or negligence
claim.143
In environmental litigation, the law of trespass focuses on whether a
tangible object—such as a power line or particles of air pollution—has
entered another person’s property.144 If a plaintiff is successful, powerful
remedies are available. A court may award nominal, compensatory, or even
punitive damages, along with injunctive relief for threatened or continuing
harms.145 For example, a plaintiff in Kenya pursued an action in trespass
after the defendant began construction on the plaintiff’s property to install a
utility line without following the prescribed land acquisition process.146 The
High Court of Kenya granted a temporary injunction against the defendant
139

COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON MATTERS RELATED TO ENVIRONMENT 4
(July 2001), http://apps.unep.org/redirect.php?file=/publications/pmtdocuments/Compendium%20of%20Judicial%20Decisions%20on%20Matters%20Related%20to%20
Environment%20National%20Decisions-20012292.pdf [hereinafter Compendium].
140
Id.
141
Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher,
38 ENVT’L L. REP. 10114-15 (2008).
142
Id.
143
Id. at 10116.
144
Id. at 10115.
145
Id. at 10116.
146
Machareus Obaga Anunda v. Kenya Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd., Environmental
and Land Civil Case No. 197, Kenya Law Reports [K.L.R.], ¶ 4, High Court of Kenya at
Kisii [H.C.K. at Kisii] (2015), available at
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/113466/.
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and ordered that fair compensation be provided to the property owner.147
When applicable, the law of trespass can offer a strong remedy for property
owners against those trespassing onto their property.
2. Nuisance
The second common law remedy has two variations: public and private
nuisance, collectively considered “the true ancestors of environmental
law.”148 Public nuisance actions arise when there is “an act or omission that
causes inconvenience or damage to the public health or public order, or an
act which constitutes an obstruction of public rights.”149 In general, a public
nuisance occurs when the effect of the interference is so pervasive that it
would be unreasonable for a single person to challenge the matter herself.150
Public officers, such as attorneys general, are usually the only party with
standing to challenge a public nuisance.151
Private nuisance, while not always distinct from public nuisance, arises
when there is a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land.”152 Courts often evaluate private nuisance
actions by considering factors such as whether the utility of the defendant’s
conduct is outweighed by the gravity of the harm.153
In the environmental context, a property owner may rely on private
nuisance theory to challenge interferences like dust emissions from an
adjoining cement plant, unpleasant odors from a nearby pig farm, or

147

Id. at ¶ 5.
Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10116.
149
Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 927 (1999). In other words, public
nuisances concern “interference with the public’s reasonable comfort and convenience.”
Compendium, supra note 139, at 4.
150
Compendium, supra note 139, at 4.
151
Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 927.
152
Id. at 928.
153
Id. at 929.
148
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groundwater contamination from a pulp mill.154 Similarly, an environmental
public nuisance could include the contamination of groundwater, a release
of hazardous chemicals into the environment, or common cesspools.155 As a
result, parties may obtain a variety of remedies. A court may order equitable
relief: operational limitations (such as emissions control devices), the
establishment of funds for the benefit of injured persons, or even the
imposition of a permanent injunction if the problem is not resolved within a
specified timeframe.156 Parties may also recover money damages
corresponding to depreciation in property value and certain special
damages, including losses from injury to livestock or direct damage to
property.157
Several of these remedies were employed in Naigum v. Nanette, where
the plaintiff’s health and property use were affected by an industrial
byproduct that emanated from the defendant’s adjoining property.158 The
defendant ran a licensed cabinetry business that employed the use of
industrial electrical machines and caused noise and dust pollution in the
residential area where the plaintiff lived.159 The Supreme Court of Mauritius
ordered the defendant to pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff and
placed a permanent injunction against the defendant to prohibit further
hazardous industrial practices.160

154

Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10119.
Id. at 10120-21.
156
Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 935.
157
Id. at 934-35. In some circumstances, even punitive damages may be available.
Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10120.
158
Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment Related Cases,
Revised 2nd Edition, at 28 (Jan. 2015) (citing Naigum R.L. v. Nanette G., 2004 SCJ 286
(Mauritius)),
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/publications/Compendium_summaries_judicial_de
cisions_revised_second_edition.pdf [hereinafter Compendium 2015].
159
Id.
160
Id.
155
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3. Str ict Liability
Under the theory of strict liability, a person is absolutely liable for the
harmful results of any escapes from that person’s land.161 In other words,
“[t]he theory of strict liability in tort for harms to strangers holds a party
responsible for the harm that it causes by way of trespass or nuisance,
regardless of the level of precaution taken.”162 The theory derives from the
famous case of Rylands v. Fletcher,163 in which a property owner was held
liable when his water reservoir flooded an adjoining property.164 In the
United States, many courts have expanded the theory to cover other
“abnormally dangerous activities.”165 In the environmental context,
“abnormally dangerous activities” include, among others, crop dusting,
operating oil refineries in densely populated residential areas, blasting, and
fumigating buildings with toxic gas.166 In this way, strict liability remains a
powerful theory in the environmental context, “as courts generally reason
that, quite simply, entities engaged in dangerous activity should bear the
costs of damages caused thereby.”167
In Ndetei v. Orbit Chemical Industries Limited (Orbit), the High Court of
Kenya relied upon Rylands when it ordered an injunction against Orbit’s
industrial practice.168 Orbit manufactured soaps, detergents, and other
related products, and it regularly drained industrial wastewater onto

161

Compendium, supra note 139, at 5.
Richard Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How the Modern
Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way, at 8 (2015),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/research/richard-epstein-common-lawenvironmental-protection-how-modern-environmental-moveme.
163
Rylands v. Fletcher [1868], L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
164
Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10122.
165
Id.
166
Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 937.
167
Id. at 937-38.
168
David M. Ndetei v. Orbit Chemical Indus. Ltd., Civil Suit No. 147, K.L.R., ¶ 9,
H.C.K. at Kisii (2014), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/99244/.
162
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Ndetei’s property.169 Ndetei complained that due to Orbit’s negligent
construction and operation of the plant, Ndetei’s property had become unfit
for occupation or agricultural use.170 For these reasons, the court
additionally ordered Orbit to pay compensatory damages for soil
restoration, general damages for nuisance, and court costs.171
4. Negligence
Unlike the three preceding causes of action, negligence actions do not
depend on the occupation of property.172 As a general rule, a person is
negligent when he breaches a duty of due care, resulting in injury to another
person.173 In terms of remedies, a plaintiff may be entitled to compensatory
damages and possibly (albeit rarely) punitive damages, but injunctive relief
is not available.174 In the environmental context, negligence is often
combined with the theories above and might be “the least productive of all
tort law theories for environmental practitioners.”175 An example of
environmental negligence where compensatory damages were awarded
occurred in Agbara et al. v. Shell Petroleum et al., where the plaintiffs
claimed that Shell’s negligence in constructing and failing to maintain a
pipeline caused the uninhabitability of several square miles of land.176 The
Federal High Court of Nigeria ordered Shell to pay the plaintiffs
compensatory damages for the systematic damage caused by a pipe that, for
15 years, had leaked crude oil onto the plaintiffs’ property and caused the

169

Id. at ¶ 30.
Id. at ¶ 5.
171
Id. at ¶ 1.
172
Compendium, supra note 139, at 5.
173
Id.
174
Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10121.
175
Id. at 10122.
176
Compendium 2015, supra note 158, at 52 (citing
Agbara et al. v. Shell Petroleum et al. (Unreported) Suit No. FHC/ASB/CS/231/2001 of
(June 14, 2010) (Nigeria)).
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property to become uninhabitable.177 The Court also ordered Shell to
remediate the contamination and restore the land to its original state.178
5. Common Law Remedies Evaluated
Since the birth of the major environmental acts in the United States—
such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species
Act, and others—common law actions to address environmental
contamination have been much less common in the United States.179 This
may be beginning to change in the United States.180 Nevertheless, because
most Sub-Saharan African countries do not have similarly comprehensive
environmental legislation and accompanying regulations, the use of these
common law actions may be more helpful and applicable in helping to
protect the Sub-Saharan African environment.
The application of these common law actions is not without its detractors.
According to some critics, the actions are “cumbersome,” only “reactive in
nature,” and merely “operate on the basis of reactive cure rather than
prevention.”181 A second objection to applying the common law to
environmental litigation is that it perceives “the common law as a rather
primitive legal system.”182 Building on this shaky foundation, the critics’
177

Id.
Id.
179
R. Trent Taylor, The Obsolescence of Environmental Common Law, ECOLOGY L. Q.
40 (2013).
180
See Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Common Law the Free Market Solution to Pollution?, 24
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNI. SCH. OF L. PROP. AND ENV’T RES. CTR. (2012)
(collecting articles from advocates calling for the use of common law approaches to
protect property rights and concluding that while the “case for common law
environmental protection has not been made . . . that does not mean it cannot be”); see
also Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 959-63; MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 110, 115-18 (1996) (defending a common law
approach to environmental law, but recognizing that no significant changes are on the
horizon).
181
Erhun, supra note 138, at 31.
182
GREVE, supra note 180, at 116.
178

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Ahead of the Curve…

argument next posits that only comprehensive legislation and administrative
regulations “can account for the complexities of modern life.”183
But, as a fair, analytical evaluation of the common law approach reveals,
“nothing in the basic logic of common-law arrangements precludes their
extension to more complex cases.”184 In reality, the very simplicity of the
common law allows it to apply in many different situations—“[t]he basic
intuition of the common law is that precisely because the world is complex,
it needs simple rules that allow it to be managed not through collective,
centralized, one-size-fits-all arrangements but in small chunks and by
individuals who are likely to get the results.”185 Thus, Sub-Saharan Africans
may find these common law actions to be very helpful in addressing their
unique environmental law situations.186

183

Id.; see also Joseph Sax, Introduction, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, at xvii (Clifford Rechtstaffen & Denise Antolini, eds.)
(2007) (opining that “the traditional common law remedies were utterly inadequate to
deal with contemporary environmental problems”). One could respond that it is
impossible for even the exceptionally complex U.S. environmental regulations to handle
every possible environmental situation. “It is uncontested, for example, that much
regulation is woefully inefficient and needlessly expensive; only the order of magnitude
is seriously disputed.” GREVE, supra note 180, at 87. Greve similarly argues that this
perspective on regulations “is emphatically not a partisan phenomenon but approaches a
consensus: virtually no economist or policy analyst of any political persuasion would
defend the existing regulatory regime—taken as a whole—as even tolerably efficient and
effective.” Id.; see also id. at 88 (discussing further regulatory woes and experts critical
of environmental regulation).
184
Greve, supra note 180, at 116.
185
Id. at 116-17.
186
This author is not suggesting that these common law actions should be used to address
environmental issues to the exclusion of national regulation. Nevertheless, he is
proposing that they may be useful alongside governmental regulation to protect the
property of individuals, particularly where it is widely recognized that many Sub-Saharan
governments are less than vigilant in their monitoring of environmental contamination, to
say nothing of their actual enforcement of their environmental regulations.
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VI. POLICIES THAT ARE WORKING TO PROMOTE TENURE SECURITY
Recognizing that land tenure security is instrumental not only in helping
the poor but also in protecting the environment, this part discusses policies
to promote tenure security in two types of situations: (A) where tenure
security needs to be strengthened, such as in many customary tenure
situations or where the individuals are using land belonging to another,
albeit without opposition; or (B) where there is almost no tenure security,
because either the land possessors’ claims are completely absent or the land
possessors have no access to the land at all.
A. Strengthening Land Tenure Security
Tenure reformers take two primary approaches to helping promote tenure
security: (1) formalizing property rights by issuing titles to land, or (2)
promoting strengthened security by helping governments recognize
traditional customary tenure.
1. For malization of Land Tenur e
There is little argument that registered land tenure is the most secure
form of tenure security.187 In considering the development of nations, “there
is a growing consensus ‘that the material rise of the West during the last’
three centuries is at least in part attributable to legal institutions formalizing
property rights.”188 In the years since South American economist Hernando
de Soto published his book, The Mystery of Capital,189 world leaders have
praised his theory that the formalization of property rights is the key to a
187

Lasse Krantz, Securing Customary Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from
New Approaches to Land Tenure Reform, GOTEBORGS UNIVERSITET DEPT. OF ECON. &
SOC’Y 1 (2015) (noting that the “conventional approach for securing property rights to
land is by establishing a system of private ownership through individual titling”).
188
Shackelford, supra note 31, at 285 (quoting O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41
AM. BUS. L. J. 459, 470 n.34 (2004).
189
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
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country developing and flourishing,190 and many nations and agencies have
sought to implement his recommendations.191 Few argue with de Soto’s
basic premises that secure property rights are invaluable to progress and
development and that providing individuals with title to property is,
wherever possible, the ideal.192
Unfortunately, formalizing land tenure—giving title to the owner of a
property that has not previously been titled—can be difficult.193 For
example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, land titles have rarely been issued, if at
all.194 Title administrators must be trained, property borders must be
established, and titles must be formatted, created, and distributed. Even
where land titles are available, the process to obtain title is often arduous
and expensive.195 As de Soto exhaustively documented, the cost to purchase
land (not including the land price) can be expensive, and obtaining legal

190

In 2004, President Bill Clinton characterized de Soto as “probably the world’s most
important living economist” because of his work on property rights. This Land Is Your
Land, WORLD POL’Y INST., http://www.world policy.org/journal/summer2011/this-landis-your-land (last visited April 21, 2016). Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W.
Bush officially backed de Soto’s views. Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 184 n.2 (1995).
191
See Hendrix, supra note 190, at 184 n.2 & 185-86 (collecting examples).
192
See id. Hendrix, after identifying six “myths” in response to de Soto’s work, admits
that “titling of property may give security” and that “security of ownership plays [an
important role] in economic development.” Id. at 209, 212. Hendrix’s main point is that
while “titling is a highly important ingredient to a more general strategy for development
. . . the true impact of titling should not be overstated, nor should other factors be ignored.
Such an overemphasis would give policymakers unrealistic expectations about the way in
which titling does impact on broadly based economic growth.” Id. at 183.
193
Indeed, some have suggested that the problems with existing land tenure in SubSaharan Africa are so complex that no effort to overcome the challenges will be
successful. Thankfully, this opinion has not stopped many individuals and institutions
from pursuing reform.
194
Liz Alden Wily, How African Governments Allow Farmers to be Pushed off Their
Land, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2012) http://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2012/mar/02/african-governments-land-deals.
195
See, e.g., Wickeri, supra note 35, at 973-74, 986 (reciting the challenges Nepali
farmers undergo to obtain land certificates, the Nepali equivalent to land titles).
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title to the land (where a title is available at all) and a building permit can be
very time-consuming.196
With a view toward promoting tenure security and reducing or
eliminating these costs and barriers, reformers such as de Soto, as well as
governments of developing countries, have sought to implement
formalization procedures in many developing countries.197 For example,
Rwanda has engaged in a series of land reforms seeking to protect property
rights for its citizens.198 Legislation was enacted providing that both sons
and daughters could inherit parental property, property rights of women in a
legal marriage were protected, and spousal consent was required before
matrimonial property was transferred.199 Subsequently, additional reforms
established a “single statutory system of land tenure that vests land
ownership with the state and provides users with long-term usufruct rights
(up to 99 years, depending on land use) that can be sold, passed on to heirs,
mortgaged, leased, or otherwise transferred.”200 Trained surveyors travelled
throughout the country identifying parcel boundaries, recording them on
aerial photos, and issuing receipts.201 The information was transferred to a
registry, digitized, and publically displayed.202 Although more studies need
to be done, initial studies indicate that Rwanda’s tenure reforms have
196
Key Concepts, THE POWER OF THE POOR,
http://www.thepowerofthepoor.com/concepts/c7.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (citing
de Soto’s researching showing the following times and costs: in Guatemala, 4,307 days
and $9,312 (4.3 years pay); in Argentina, 3,974 days and $12,592 (4.3 years pay); in
Albania, 225 days and $816 (three months pay); in Egypt, 1,371 days, $5,070 (more than
three years pay); in Tanzania, eight years and $2,252 (more than three years pay)); see
also DE SOTO, supra note 189, at 18-28.
197
See M. Mercedes Stickler & Heather Huntington, Perceptions of Tenure Security: An
Exploratory Analysis of Pretreatment Data in Rural Communities Across Ethiopia,
Guinea, Liberia, and Zambia, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 23, 2015).
198
Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 267-74.
199
Id. at 267.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 268.
202
Id.
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provided secure tenure, helped protect the environment, and increased
protection for married women and girls.203
Nevertheless, other efforts have been less rewarding, and researchers
have found that efforts to obtain title, certification, or registration had mixed
results in strengthening individual land rights.204 Indeed, some scholars
have found that efforts to achieve formal tenure systems may increase
tenure insecurity in some places due to the conflicts between traditional
rights and the newly created legal land rights.205 Similarly, others have
recognized that attempts to bring about “exclusive, alienable and legally
registered individual land rights [are] not always the best solution for poor
rural people.”206 Many poor farmers have come to “depend on more
flexible, diversified, decentralized and common property systems over
which they can often exert greater influence and that are more conducive to
optimum uses of land.”207 In the face of these odds, many reformers have
switched their focus from formalization of property rights to strengthening
customary tenure systems.208

203

Id. at 267, 274.
See Krantz, supra note 187, at 1-2; see also Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes,
supra note 61, at 9.
205
Otsuka & Place, Land Tenure, supra note 9 at 263 (explaining that tenure insecurity
results because of conflicts between traditional rights and the newly formalized rights and
opining that “[o]nce the individualization of land rights has been achieved endogenously,
land registration is likely to strengthen land rights because of the absence of overlapping
land rights among family members.”); see also Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes,
supra note 61, at 10.
206
IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 6.
207
Id.
208
To be sure, there are still those who favor the effort to formalize property rights.
Hernando de Soto continues to urge that formalization is necessary and that without overt
efforts, “it could take 300, 500 years” for formalization to occur and for greater
prosperity to be achieved. Tapscott, supra note 22, at 33, quoting de Soto, “Commanding
Heights,” Video Transcript, PBS (March 30, 2001), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_
hernandodesoto.html.
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2. Customar y Tenur e as a Means of Tenur e Refor m
Due to the challenges of efforts to replace customary tenure systems with
title formalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, tenure reformers have shifted
their approach from replacement to adaptation.209 In other words, reformers
have concluded that instead of implementing Western-style individual land
rights to the exclusion of customary tenure, it may be easier and more
effective to work within the customary tenure system to strengthen the
property rights of the community. North American readers may appreciate
the example of the challenges the United States Congress encountered when
it attempted to convert Native American communal tenure to individually
titled property, a process called “allotment.”210 According to one reviewer,
the allotment failed because Congress sought to “impose private property
on the indigenous peoples who had no conception of the private ownership
of land.”211 A more insightful perspective, however, suggests that because
the Native Americans actually already possessed a “complex system of
fluid tribal property rights,” the allotment failed because it “impos[ed] a
rigid system that failed to account for traditional Native American property
rights regimes that were based on cultural norms reflective of the common
social good.”212 Thus, tenure reformers cannot simply expect to establish a
“single, externally-imposed and static system of private property rights”
that will be a “one-size-fits-all solution to catalyzing capital and building
wealth.”213 The goal must be to work with local communities in customary
tenures to reinforce rather than replace customary tenure systems.214
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World Resources, supra note 18, at 61.
Shackelford, supra note 31, at 277.
211
Id. (quoting Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the
Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (2001)).
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One of the more innovative approaches to helping establish a more secure
customary system has been proposed by land tenure expert Liz Alden Wily,
who suggests that “it is above all rural people’s rights to the collectively
possessed and used ‘commons’ that need protection in Africa.”215 Alden
Wily includes the commons area in her proposal for two reasons.216 First,
these

resources—off-farm

woodlands

and

pastures—are

vulnerable to being used and abused by outsiders.

217

especially

Second, these

commons are considered by many African governments to be publican
lands.218 Alden Wily’s approach therefore works to secure the entire area—
both individually held property and off-farm commons—as communityowned property.219
B. Creating Land Tenure Security
For many of the Sub-Saharan African poor, their poverty stems from
effective or complete landlessness. They may be slum-dwellers with no
more land than that upon which the crate they call home sits, or they may be
trying to scratch some meager existence from the dirt alongside a rural road.
In any case, the discussion of providing land tenure security is meaningless
to them because they have no access to land.
In such circumstances, particularly where “a high degree of ownership
concentration is combined with a significant level of rural poverty
attributable to lack of access to land, fisheries and forests,” land
redistribution may be an effective means of providing the poor with land
and secure land tenure.220 Allocation of public land,221 voluntary and
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Krantz, supra note 187, at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
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Id. For additional customary tenure reform proposals and studies of existing reforms,
see Knight, supra note 35.
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market-based purchases of land, or seizure by eminent domain and
redistribution of land to the poor “can facilitate broad and equitable access
to land and inclusive rural development.”222
Certain practices are necessary, however, to help ensure that land
redistribution leads to secure land tenure and not bitterness and resentment,
which can lead to open hostility, strife, and revenge.223 Thus, whether the
land is seized by eminent domain or procured on the market, efforts must be
made to ensure that adequate compensation is provided without undue delay
for the expropriated or purchased land.224 Many tenure reform efforts have
failed largely because the financing for expropriation has been insufficient
to adequately compensate the former owners of the land and legitimize the
reforms.225 Insufficient compensation almost guarantees that the landowners
who are losing property whose property is being taken will “evade the law,
cause the law to be rescinded, or violently resist enforcement” of it.226
Payments may be less than market value, but should replace the former
owners’ lost income from the land.227 Furthermore, where the transfer is by

221

The distribution of public lands is not uniformly supported. Professors Prosterman and
Hanstad argue that alternatives such as distribution of public lands, voluntary sales of
land through “market-assisted” means, and resettlement programs have failed by either
not having any significant impact or, worse, being simply “costly, disruptive, and
environmentally damaging.” Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 780-81.
222
FAO, Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 4, at 25. Since there is some evidence that
formalization increases rental prices, it may be helpful to consider creating tenure
security in leasing arrangements without reallocating property rights—an issue that has
not been considered adequately. Similarly, removing restrictions on renting land
promotes the rural economy without the expense of traditional titling efforts, as studies in
Ethiopia and South Asia demonstrate. Shackelford, supra note 31, at 298–99.
223
Tapscott, supra note 22, at 31 (observing that forced transfer of land without
compensation “creates a host of political and human rights concerns and can instigate
enduring tension and conflict”).
224
Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 778; FAO, Voluntary Guidelines, supra
note 4, at 26, 27 (¶¶ 15.4, 15.9).
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Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 778.
226
Id. at 781.
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eminent domain, the state must be careful not to communicate a sense of
judgment or penalty on the former owners.228
Care must be taken to ensure that the redistribution is successful. While
the amount of the land provided to the beneficiary should be sufficient to
earn an adequate standard of living,229 the size of the property supplied need
not be excessively large, as even small land plots with tenure security can
provide significant benefits.230 Providing plots of land sufficient for a small
house and garden, between 1/25 acre (about 1,730 square feet) and 1/10
acre (about 4,350 square feet), to agricultural families has proved to make a
significant difference for the beneficiaries.231 While these plot sizes may
seem very small to many Westerners, it is important to realize both how
productive a small plot can be232 and how valuable to a poor family the plot
will be.233 The state should use the amount of land a family can farm with
its own labor and capital as a guideline for sizing the property.234
In addition to right-sizing the property redistributed, the state should also
ensure that the beneficiary has access to credit, markets, farming advice,
technical assistance, and other resources necessary to make the
redistribution successful.235 Some tenure reforms have failed in large part
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Id. at 782.
FAO, Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 4, at 26.
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Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 782.
231
Id at 782-83 (collecting case studies); Tapscott, supra note 22, at 31, 35.
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because, despite the provision of land and tenure security to the
beneficiaries, the new owners had “no other inputs and services to be able
to cultivate [the land] properly.”236

VII. CONCLUSION
A growing body of scholarly research ably demonstrates that land tenure
security provides relief for the poor. Those with no- or low-income, upon
obtaining secure access to land, enjoy improved livelihoods because they
can grow more food, harvest more products for consumption or trade, invest
in more economically productive activities, and use the property to obtain
credit.
The research is less developed but equally persuasive that land tenure
security also promotes environmental protection. Where a country adopts
law and policies promoting and protecting tenure security, it can
significantly reduce environmental degradation. Land tenure security also
results in greater environmental protection through better stewardship of
natural resources. Thus, farmers who have secure land tenure are motivated
not only to make improvements to aid in their agricultural work but also to
help improve their environment. Providing secure land tenure under the rule
of law and enforcing claims under the common law, enables developing
countries to achieve their environmental goals faster.
To achieve these ends, progress must continue to be made in formalizing
property rights, strengthening customary tenure systems, redistributing land,
and providing tenure security to the landless poor.

236

IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 6, 13 (noting that “measures to strengthen
land tenure security must be complemented by pro-poor policies, services and
investments that reduce vulnerability and enable people to make the best use of their
access to land”).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

